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1 Introduction
What did Bhaṭṭa Jayanta want to say when he used different terms which could
apparently all be translated as “meaning”? And how can we settle the issue? In-
ner consistency and comparison to related coeval texts are of key importance, but
should not we also try to attain an increased awareness of the problematics at
stake? The present study aims at addressing both the speciϐic question and its
more general outputs.
1.1 Critical edition of non-literary texts
Generally speaking, European¹ philologists have beenmostly interested in the tex-
tual criticism and edition of literary texts rather than of non-literary ones. Such an
attitude became predominant especially after the beginning of the 19th century,
when the Romanticist canons inϐluenced both arts and literature and the scientiϐic
disciplines devoted to their analysis.Within such canons, “beauty”wasmostly con-
sidered worth of scholars’ attention, and only art and literature were viewed as
having such quality. Therefore, the attention paid by the textual and literary crit-
ics to the literary tradition of the ancient civilizations, such as Classical Greece and
India, exceeded by far the interest towards their technical writings: philologists
dealt primarily with writings that could lead to aesthetic pleasure, and tended to
disregard the remainingbranchesof the cultural heritage of thepast. Thus, inmany
cases the non-literary or technical texts— ranging from architecture to culinary—
of Greek and Latin authors have lacked any critical edition and scholars’ interest
they deserved up to recent times. The Ancient Indian technical literature received
even less attention.²
A deplorable consequence of such an attitude is the fact that the technical lit-
erature of the past, even when taken into consideration, was studied, translated
and edited by authors mostly coming from a humanistic, philological background,
with no specialised competence in the corresponding ϐields of knowledge. Inmany
cases this disregard of the technical skills of the ancient authors, as well as the un-
derestimation of the scientiϐic training needed for their correct comprehension,
led to a number of misunderstandings and, consequently, to some inappropriate
emendations of the extant texts.
¹Throughout this essay, we will use “European” in a cultural and not merely geographical sense,
including people based in countries (such as USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) in which the
European culture played the major role in shaping the society.
²Some noteworthy exceptions are still attested, especially in the ϐield of Grammar and, later, Bud-
dhist philosophical and religious texts; wewish tomention, for example, O. Böhtlingk’s work on the An-
cient Indian grammatical tradition (which turned out to be a highly formalized scientiϐic ϐield), which
started with his edition and translation of Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī.
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1.2 A specialist approach is always needed: A case of misinter-
pretation
As an example of an ancient technical text (from the European tradition) that has
been correctly understood and fully investigated only a few years ago, when a spe-
cialist approachwas applied to it, wemay refer to the case of Archytas of Tarentum,
an Ancient Greek scholar of the Pythagorean school, Plato’s contemporary and fel-
low, who wrote a treatise on the nature of sound phenomena. Until recent times,
the fragmentary remnants of this text hadbeen studied and critically editedonlyby
classical philologists who had a very average knowledge of modern acoustics. Not
surprisingly, many of Archytas’ statements were considered too confuse, unrealis-
tic or simply wrong by the ϐirst editors. However, a recent study by C. Ciancaglini
(1998) showed thatwhat seemed senseless to the ϐirst editors of Archytas could be
interpreted as a brilliant anticipation of today’s scientiϐic view if read by a reader
skilled in contemporary acoustic theory. More speciϐically, what the ϐirst editors of
Archytas did not realizewas the fact that Archytaswas not dealingwith an abstract
physical theory of sound (as scientists would do today), but rather tried to explain
some concrete phenomena observable during sound production and perception.
Indeed, if we admit that what he described is to be viewed as belonging to the do-
main of the psychoacoustics, then his seemingly odd or inaccurate observations
suddenly become meaningful and also brilliant, and can be seen as anticipating
modern achievements in this ϐield.
Thus, for instance, when Archytas claimed that the pitch of a sound is directly
correlated to something that he called “force” he was not confusing the frequency
with the amplitude of the oscillation, as it could seem at ϐirst sight. He was instead
describing quite accurately a phenomenon which is well known to the modern
psychoacoustics, i.e., that of perceived loudness contour: the correlation between
intensity and pitch within the human hearing apparatus is not ϐlat, with frequency
response of human hearing varying with amplitude. In order, for us, to perceive ei-
ther a very high-pitched or a very low-pitched sound at a certain loudness level we
need more sound energy comparing to the middle-range frequencies at the same
loudness level. In other words, the extremities of the human auditory ϐield require
amajor soundpressure for being heard. This iswhat Archytas stated in his treatise,
even if only from a loosely empirical point of view. Instead, what his ϐirst editors
had in mind is the abstract principle according to which the frequency of an os-
cillation is in no way correlated with its intensity. This is generally true, but does
not apply to the speciϐic case that Archytas had in mind, namely, the perception of
sound by the human ear.
This example shows how a scientiϐic approach to an ancient text can help us to
interpret and appreciate possibly brilliant intuitions therein. Accordingly, we have
to give up the assumption that every ϐield of the ancient science is so primitive that
no modern scientiϐic education is needed in order to understand it.
Furthermore, not only our comprehension of the ancient texts is improved, but
also the textual criticism in itself can beneϐit from such an approach. Indeed, the
clearer we understand a text (apparently odd ormeaningless), the fewerwrong or
unneeded emendations we will conjecture. In this respect, a lectio difϔicilior repre-
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sents a challenge for the readerwho is called to give it a new interpretation through
a deeper scientiϐic analysis.³
To sum up, our point in this paper consists in defending the following assump-
tions:
1. ancient scientiϐic treatises might be very smart and anticipating, and are
therefore not to be considered “primitive” or “naı̈f” by default;
2. they deserve a thorough textual analysis and critical edition; if the existing
editions have been prepared by non-experts they must be considered inac-
curate and inappropriate;
3. the edition of such kinds of text requires, from the editors, specialised skills
in the scientiϐic ϐields they are dealing with.
Thus, for example, treatises on astronomy must be studied with the collaboration
of astronomers, or, similarly, treatises on medicine must be interpreted with the
collaboration of medical specialists: philologists alone are not enough. Such an ap-
proach might help us discover some non-obvious aspects of the ancient thought,
and sometimes even allow us to recover a passage from the wrong readings possi-
bly suggested by non-specialist editors.
1.3 The case of philosophy of language and linguistics
One could think that only the most technical writings of the ancient authors re-
quire a specialised approach, while many other topics can be easily understood by
an average philologistwith no specialist training in the corresponding ϐield. Philos-
ophy of language and general linguistics might be thought to be one of such “easy
to understand” ϐields. Indeed, every well-educated adult speaker of a language is
naturally induced to think that s/he can grasp the inner functioning of such a lan-
guage thanks to her/his speaking abilities. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Studies on language have developed enormously in the last two centuries and in
no way are their arguments easy to grasp for a non-specialist. Ancient studies are
often—especially in the case of Ancient Indian thought—at least as sophisticated
and reϐined as the modern ones (as the technical sophistication of Pāṇini’s gram-
mar easily shows).
1.3.1 Whitney’s misunderstanding of Pāṇini
To exemplify this point we can recall the case of the European reception of the
Indian traditional syntactic theory, i.e., Pāṇini’s kāraka system. This grammatical
device offers a description of the predicate and its arguments in a simple sentence
based on a clear-cut distinction between linguistic forms and their functions, re-
spectively, nominal morphology of the predicate’s arguments vs. their semantic
roles. A good comprehension of this distinction has been reached by contempo-
rary linguistics only a few decades ago with Ch. Fillmore’s notion of Deep Cases,
³See, e.g., the discussion of a lacuna in one of Archytas’ fragments by Ciancaglini (1998: §6).
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and its later equivalents (see Fillmore 1968). Therefore, wemust recognize Pāṇini
as a brilliant grammarian who anticipatedmodern scientiϐic achievements millen-
nia ago (Pāṇini is usually dated to ca. 5th cent. BC).
The ϐirst Sanskritists who dealt with Pāṇini’s grammar did not have enough
skills in the linguistic theory in order to understand many points of Pāṇini’s ap-
proach. Thus,Whitney totally failed to appreciatePāṇini’s kārakadevice and,more-
over, considered the morphology vs. semantics distinction a “difϐicult and danger-
ousmethod” of analysis.⁴Whitney’s prejudice against Pāṇini’s tradition in general,
and against this theory in particular has been proven totally untenable only after
the contemporary linguistics had developed an analytic approach equivalent to
Pāṇini’s.⁵
By contrast, thanks to a more scientiϐic awareness of the complexity of this
topic, scholarswho analyzed Pāṇini’s kāraka device from amodern linguistic back-
ground were even able to use it for a better understanding of Pāṇini himself, e.g.,
by formulating some textual conjectures regarding the composition history of this
part of Indian grammar (see Butzenberger 1995; Keidan 2012).
1.3.2 Approaching Indian philosophy of language fromwithout
Generally speaking, Ancient Indian philosophy of language and grammar theory
had reached such a high level of sophistication that contemporary studies on lan-
guage can establish a direct dialogue with them. Such a dialogue would be a peer-
to-peer conversation, not just a matter of historical or ethnographical curiosity.
Thismeans that a scholardealingwithAncient Indianphilosophyof languagegreatly
enhances his/her chances to understand the texts s/he is dealing with if s/he has
also a theoretical comprehension of the linguistic theories depicted in the text.
For a European scholar, such a comprehension is, normally, acquired through the
study of modern philosophy of language and linguistics.
An objection which could be raised in this connection (and had been raised
by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya during the 15th World Sanskrit Conference, Delhi,
January 2012) regards the need of the study of non-Indian linguistics in order to
understand a Sanskrit treatise on language. Could not— is the implicit point in our
case — the study of Ancient Indian linguistics be enough to understand Jayanta?
Why should one do the effort of learning also contemporary linguistics, which is
chieϐly of European origin?
An approach based also on European material is surely indispensable if one
aims not just at understanding, but also at translating a Sanskrit text into a Eu-
ropean language. Today’s readers are, to give an example, well aware of how the
⁴“Pāṇini does not take up the cases as forms of nouns, setting forth the various uses of each, after
our manner; he adopts the vastly more difϐicult and dangerous method of establishing a theoretical
list of modes of verb-modiϐication by case, or of ideal case-relations (he calls them kāraka, ‘factor’ or
‘adjunct’), to which he then distributes the cases” (Whitney 1893: 171). Whitney’s counterclaim was
that the case-endings categorization would have been a sufϐicient and adequate analytic tool in this
respect.
⁵The attitude of F. Bopp was quite different in this respect, since he took very seriously the tradi-
tional Ancient Indian conception — ultimately based on Pāṇini — of root introducing it into the Euro-
pean linguistic debate (see Alϐieri 2014).
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translation of varṇa as ‘letter’ is not just ambiguous, but plainly wrong (seeWezler
1994). Still, generations of scholarswhowere not aware of the distinction between
aphonemeand itswritten counterpart haveused the term letter (or its equivalents
in other European languages) as if it were the exact translation of varṇa, thusmak-
ing Indian speculations looknaı̈f and far less appealing to linguists. Similarly, only a
good knowledge of linguistic terminology can be the basis of a reliable translation
of a Sanskrit linguistic text, since the latter also relies on a speciϐic terminology,
and should not be misrepresented as employing vague and imprecise terms. For
instance, translating both pada and śabda in all the contexts as ‘word’ means— in
many cases— to project onto the Sanskrit authors an ambiguity which is only due
to the translator’s faint knowledge of (contemporary) linguistic theory (on śabda,
see also infra, section 2.4).⁶
However, even in order just to understand the gist of a Sanskrit linguistic argu-
ment, one needs an adequate training in linguistics. It is surely possible to achieve
it from within the Indian tradition, if one happens to be born in it and is not in-
terested in communicating with anyone outside it.⁷ By contrast, we doubt that a
purely inner-Indian approach can be enough in case of people initially trained out-
side it. For this kind of scholar, the lack of awareness on European linguistics will
amount to projecting their scant knowledge on much more sophisticated texts.
Conversely, becoming aware of one’s presuppositions is the ϐirst step towards
being able to predict one’s bias while reading Sanskrit material and, consequently,
to avoid their traps.⁸ Accordingly, our attempt in the present paper is to make the
reader feel the gap that separates us from the theories of Jayanta.
Among the scholars who have tried to implement a cross-cultural methodol-
ogy to the understanding of Indian philosophy of language are scholars interested
in Buddhist epistemology (e.g., Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011) or in
the philosophical schools of (mostly Navya) Nyāya (e.g., Matilal 1990, Ganeri 1999,
Ganeri 1996, Phillips andRamanujaTatacharya2004) aswell as inMı̄māṃsā (Sider-
its 1985, Siderits 1986, Matilal and Sen 1988). They all implicitly or explicitly refer
to the framework of analytic philosophy and their results have often been quite in-
teresting, both for Sanskritists and for analytic philosophers (noteworthy is also
⁶While we were ϐinishing this essay, we have been gladly surprised to receive an essay by a Sanskri-
tist working also on contemporary linguistics and closing with a very similar point: “Within contem-
porary academia, Western terminology represents the only shared medium through which linguistic
historiographical communications can be implemented and, therefore, comparisons can be traced. In
other words, I argue that there is no alternative to that of ϐinding suitable Western translations for
terms such as varṇa, akṣara and eḻuttu that, otherwise, would remain mostly unknown alien objects
for the scholarly community. However, this leads to another issue because Western linguistics is not a
monolithic or homogeneous discipline. […] Therefore, if they want to be understood, scholars working
in the ϐield of linguistic historiography must be attentive both to the meta-language of the indigenous
traditions under investigation and to theWesternmeta-language throughwhich they choose to present
these traditions to the scholarly community” (Ciotti 2012).
⁷By the way, do such native Sanskrit scholars, untouched by the introduction of English education
in India, still exist, given what J. L. Mehta (1970: 313) called — following M. Heidegger — the “Euro-
peanization of the Earth”?
⁸A typical example is that of the European concept of “god”, which has been absorbed by most Eu-
ropeans independently of their personal beliefs and which tends to be automatically— and often erro-
neously — projected onto the Sanskrit materials.
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that some of the above studies have been published on the most established Ana-
lytic Philosophy journals, such as Mind). The present study hopes to add to their
workanenlargedperspectiveon theevolutionofEuropean linguistic thought,which
is itself not a single, unmoving reference point, and a deeper understanding of the
structure of Jayanta’s linguistic thought and of the terminology throughwhich this
is expressed. To be more precise, Jayanta’s theory of signiϐication has been anal-
ysed in Ganeri 1996: 12–16 from the point of view of its opposition to the view of
particulars as the meanings of linguistic expressions. We add to Ganeri’s analysis
a discussion of the other terms involved and of the Buddhist point of view.
1.4 A European comparison
In this section we wish to survey some basic conceptions related to language as
they have been deϐined by the most relevant 20th century theoreticians. Such sur-
vey is supposed to refresh the reader’s awareness of the philosophical tools that
can be helpful in analysing Jayanta’s and his opponents’ discussion on the nature
of language vs. reality relationship.
The so-called “Linguistic turn” in the philosophy of the early 20th century coin-
cided with the foundation of theoretical linguistics as a separate discipline. Inter-
estingly, the starting point for both G. Frege’s and F. de Saussure’s reasoning on lan-
guage was practically the same, i.e. the refutation of the naı̈f referentialist concep-
tion that thewords are “labels for things”. This one-to-one relation betweenwords
and things seemed untenable for Frege because different expressions were found
out to denote the same referents, while for Saussure it was untenable because lan-
guage describes reality with arbitrarily shaped words. Questioning the naı̈f refer-
entialism implied that not only the objectivity of words was put into doubt but
also that of extra-linguistic things: not only linguistic expressions can be imper-
fect and indeterminate, but also the existence of reality, its parts and classes, is
not self-evident anymore. Analytic philosophy and Saussureanism offered two dif-
ferent approaches to solve this puzzle.
On the analytic side, the solution was to limit the scientiϐic investigation to
the formal language of science (especially logic and mathematics). This simpliϐied
enormously the problem of the reference: both the formal language and the real-
ity it describes belong to the realm of abstraction, which is assumed to be certain
and objective. Thus, linguistic expressions are assumed to either refer or describe
suchmental objects as numbers, sets, etc. Synonymity becomes a question of coref-
erence, and Frege’s Bedeutung ‘referent’ vs. Sinn ‘sense’ distinction is all about the
equivalency of simple expressions (i.e. names) and complex ones (deϐinite descrip-
tions). The indeterminacy of the ordinary language in referring to reality was left
totally aside as something secondary and subjective, and therefore less important.
The second-generation analytic philosophers who attempted to include ordinary
language into analysis were not very successful and did not get plain acceptance,
since, in order to achieve this goal, they had to give up some of themost important
Frege’s postulates (like the necessity, for an expression, to possess a truth value).
Saussure chose exactly the opposite path: he excluded from his investigation
everything but the ordinary language. He was neither interested in questions per-
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taining to the classiϐication of the extra-linguistic reality, nor in discussing the ob-
jective categories of science. He presented natural languages as sets of arbitrarily
chosen lexical signs made of an arbitrary pairing of a phonological form with a
portion of the semantic continuum. In such a way, the signiϔied is all but objective,
and does not correspond at all either to a stable element of extra-linguistic reality
or to a well-deϐined scientiϐic category. The only thing we are certain concerning
the signiϐied of a sign is that it is different with respect to all other signs. This im-
plies that every historically attested language selects its own set of signs that tai-
lor the knowledgeable continuum into arbitrary segments. Moreover, the sign is
an abstract notion belonging to the collective language (termed langue), while ev-
ery single usage of a sign (termed parole) creates a concrete contextual meaning
(termed signiϔication) which is not fully predictable from the abstract sign. This
concrete meaning is Saussure’s closest equivalent of the notion of ‘referent’ as it
was postulated by the analytic philosophers, with the difference that it is rooted
in the individual mental representation of reality, rather than in the reality itself
(such individual level was called subjektive Vorstellungen by Frege, who however
disregarded it totally).
Since Saussure’s signiϐied is detached fromreality and the objective knowledge,
one might ask where it comes from. The answer, that can be inferred from Saus-
sure’s writings, is that the concrete usage builds up the abstract sign. In this, he
anticipated the notion of meaning-as-use, defended by the late Wittgenstein and
developed by other philosophers inϐluenced by him (such as Grice, for example).
According to this approach, the only certainty that we can have about themeaning
of a linguistic expression is the series of its previous uses. Since a given linguistic
expressions has been used in order to refer to such-and-such, the speaker decides
to use it with reference to something analogous, hoping that the hearer will under-
stand his or her communicative intention.
2 A case study: Jayanta on meaning and reference
The point that wewish to stress is that also philosophy of language and linguistics
are as specialised as many other ϐields, and deserve a technical approach. In order
to critically edit a linguo-philosophical treatise, the editors have to be well versed
in philosophical terminology, as far as in the general history of philosophy. If the
former is lacking, onewill not be able to do justice to the complexity of the text, nor
to communicatewith philosophically interested readers. If the latter is lacking, one
will not be able to evaluate the importance of the contribution of each given author.
Moreover, our analysiswill highlight that the problems faced (and at times also the
solutions found) by Indian philosophers of languagewere often similar to the ones
faced by European philosophers in the last century.
We will now illustrate such a claim by analysing some passages and the ter-
minology of a chapter devoted to the philosophy of language extracted from the
Nyāyamañjarī, a philosophical encyclopaedia by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. The Nyāyamañ-
jarī belongs to a genre that, within the traditional Sanskrit literary classiϐication,
is called śāstra ‘scientiϐic treatise’. As such, it must be considered as being written
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for a specialised audience of philosophers (including all the manyfold branches
of the Indian philosophical tradition). This means that it demands for the atten-
tion of scholars trained in the analysis of the philosophical questions dealt with by
Jayanta.
2.1 Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī, book 5
Jayanta lived in Kaśmı̄r in the ninth to tenth century ĈĊ.⁹ HisNyāyamañjarī (hence-
forth NM) is an encyclopaedic compendium in twelve books. It is conceptually
structured into two major parts: the ϐirst six books treat the pramāṇas ‘means to
acquire knowledge’(such as sense perception, inference and language); the second
six the prameyas ‘objects of knowledge’ and the other 14 padārthas ‘categories’ ac-
ceptedbyNyāya. Four out of twelve books of this treatise are dedicated to language,
seen both from a linguistic and from an epistemological points of view. The ϐifth
book of the NM (henceforth NM 5) is the place where the topic of the word- and
sentence-meaning is discussed.
NM 5 is located within the portion of the NM dedicated to the study of the in-
struments of knowledge and, consequently, all discussions about language are to
be considered as related to language as an epistemic tool and, therefore, to the
conditions for its validity as an instrument of knowledge. More in detail, the valid-
ity of language as instrument of knowledge is tantamount to its ability to convey
knowledge about reality. Thus, speaking about language meant, for Jayanta, also
speaking about the conditions for language to convey knowledge, and to describe
reality. In this way, linguistic, epistemological and ontological issues are all inter-
mingled in the NM 5.
TheNMproves that its author hadmastered bothNyāya andMı̄māṃsā and had
a solid knowledge of grammar and of the Buddhist apoha theory.¹⁰ This amounts
to say that he was conversant with all major linguistic and linguo-philosophical
theories of his time.
Thus, Jayanta came from a civilization which excelled in linguistic analysis and
was himself a cultivated specialist in the theory of language. Why should one try
to understand him without comparably sophisticated instruments? Indeed, as we
wish to demonstrate here, a naı̈f approach to his text runs the risk of missing sev-
eral important distinctions. By contrast, only a specialist approach to his text al-
lows a full appreciation of his reϐined categorization of linguistic phenomena.
2.2 A point of departure: the question of “naïf referentialism”
Those who are not used to investigate the relationship of cognition, language and
reality are generally inclined to think that there does not exist any particular gap
⁹Unlike in the case ofmost other Indian authors, his dates canbe settledwith relative certainty, since
he served asminister of king SƵaṅkaravarman,who reigned from883 to 902 according to the chronology
of the Rajataraṅginī as reconstructed in Stein (1961: 98).
¹⁰K. Kataoka (see Kataoka 2008, 2009, 2010) and the translation of these portions of the NM 5 elab-
orated with Alex Watson, and published in this volume shows how he distinguished between different
versions of the theory (attributable to Dignāga, Dharmakı̄rti and Dharmottara). In this article, the term
Buddhist always refers to the so-called Buddhist epistemological school.
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between them: the “thoughts”, the “words” and the “objects” can be superimposed
on each other unproblematically and univocally, and words are simple “names”
or “labels” for (external) things.¹¹ We will term this position “naı̈f referentialism”.
This approach, though too simplistic, effectively, played an important role as its
rejection became the indirect cause of the well-known “linguistic turn” in the phi-
losophy of the end of the 19th century, started by G. Frege. Parallelly, also themost
inϐluential thinker in the ϐield of linguistics of the same period, i.e. F. de Saussure,
grounded his investigations on the criticism of a similar simplistic theory of words
as a nomenclature, or “labels for things”, which was quite wide-spread among the
linguists of his time.
In the present paperwewish to note that naı̈f referentialism,which is implicitly
adopted by several Sanskritists who attempt to analyse the Ancient Indian philos-
ophy on language (see for instance the way the problem is framed in Bronkhorst
1999), does not, or at least not always, represent a good explanatory framework.
This not only because it is not tenable in general, but also because, in particu-
lar, it does not represent a ϐitting parallel to the Ancient Indian thinking on this
topic. However, its more sophisticated version, i.e. the referential theory of names
(fromMilleanism to Kripke’s rigid designators and Putnam’s natural kinds), is, on
the contrary, partly similar to the positions held by those non-Buddhist Indian
thinkers, whose positions are usually described as “direct realist” (Ganeri 1999).
2.3 Words and things in NM 5
NM5displays a rich terminology referring to the relation between a śabda ‘linguis-
tic expression’ and its corresponding artha ‘meaning’ (or ‘referent’, see infra, sec-
tion 2.4). The latter is said by different pūrvapakṣins ‘objectors’ at the beginning of
the section on vākyārtha ‘sentence meaning’ (NM: 69ff) to be bāhya ‘external’, vās-
tava ‘real’, to exist bahir ‘outside’, sattāyā ‘ontologically’ or, by contrast, to be only
a jñāna ‘cognition’, to exist pratītyā ‘as notion’ or pāramārthiko nāsti ‘ultimately
not to exist’. Among others, the position of naı̈f referentialism is presented (“Oth-
ers, by contrast, say that the sentence-meaning is external [and]¹² that it is a real
mutual connection of word-meanings”, NM: 69). This most extreme formulation
is rejected by Jayanta in a short passage, as if, in such an extreme form, the naı̈f
referentialism were not really an option worth discussing in full. Jayanta confutes
direct realism by eliminating all possible ways to justify it, since he shows that
linguistic expressions cannot be said to correspond to their meanings neither as
conceived in one’s mind nor as existing in the outer world. Thus, it is impossible to
explain through direct realism the meaning and truth-value of normal statements
(e.g. “Jayanta was the author of the Nyāyamañjarī”). This claim is further elabo-
¹¹By “things” we mean both physical objects and any other manifestations of reality, such as pro-
cesses, properties, interactions, etc.
¹²Here and anywhere in this article, square brackets delimit insertions of words which are neither
explicitly (as distinct lexemes) nor implicitly (through, e.g., verbal terminations) present in the Sanskrit
text but are needed for its translation. Insertionswithin roundparentheses indicate, in contrast, glosses
by the current authors. Romanpunctuationhas been adopted in the transliteration of Sanskrit texts and
their translations. daṇḍas and double daṇḍas have been kept only in the case of verses.
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rated upon by Jayanta’s claim that, to begin with, the totality of word-meanings
cannot exist together in one’s cognition. In fact, according to the school of Nyāya,
to which also Jayanta belonged, each cognition is atomic and cannot be stretched
so as to accommodatewithin itself all concepts needed to understand or justify the
truth of any given statement. As for using the outer world to ground the meaning
and the truth value of a statement, Jayanta explains that even if all the referents
evoked by a certain statement exist together in the external world, this cannot be
the basis to ascertain the meaning of a speciϔic sentence and justify its truth. In
fact, in the outer world all referents co-exist, not just the ones named in a given
sentence. Thus, if ontology were the basis to ascertain the meaning of a sentence,
since all referents co-exist at any given time, all possible meanings would be un-
derstood simultaneously, and not just the one of the sentence just uttered. In other
words, once one has admitted thatwe need the outerworld in order to understand
the meaning of a sentence, there is no way to delimit the speciϐic “universes of dis-
course” corresponding to each given sentence. And in the actual external world all
referents co-exist at the same time, so that if they were the root of the sentence-
meaning, all sentence-meanings would have been conveyed at once.
This is not to say that Jayanta was a skeptic and refuted every correspondence
between language and reality. A careful reader will probably be able to detect pas-
sages not focusing on linguistics and presupposing some correspondence between
language and realitywithout giving further detail. However, when it comes towhat
Jayanta expressly said about this topic, he depicted the naı̈f referentialism as one
among several options, and one he did not opt for. At the same time, since he also
supported the reliability of language as a pramāṇa, language must in his view be
able to communicate knowledge about the world (and not just be a closed system,
though innerly consistent).
2.4 A problem of synonymity?
Jayanta used several terms which seem to be just synonyms, at least at ϐirst sight:
• artha ‘meaning’, both in a technical and non technical acceptation of the term
(originally denoting ‘purpose’),
• vācya ‘signiϐied’ (a nominalised passive verbal adjective from the root vāc-
‘to speak’),
• vyakti ‘individual’ (literally ‘visible appearance’),
• viśeṣa ‘particular’ (literally ‘distinction’),
• vastu ‘thing’ (originally a nominal form derived from the intransitive root
vas- ‘to dwell’),
• vāstava [padārtha] ‘actual [word-meaning]’ (anadjective, at timesnominalised,
deriving from vastu),
• piṇḍa ‘concrete thing’ (originally a lump of rice offered in the ritual),
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• viṣaya ‘content’ (originally ‘dominion’ or ‘range’),
• bāhya ‘external object’¹³
Furthermore, a related problem regards the ways in which Jayanta said that a
word meaning could exist (NM: 5, p. 70, see also above, section 2.3):
• pratītyā ‘cognitively’
or
• sattayā ‘ontologically’
In the present paper, we aim at answering the following question: Do all the
terms above mean the same? Are they really synonyms introduced for the sake of
style only? Or is there something else beyond the change in terminology? Ideally,
we would like to demonstrate that such terms are not synonymous at all and refer
to a very clear-cut conceptual system of Jayanta. Our approach is, therefore, simi-
lar to that of P. Kiparsky (1979), who gave a new interpretation to some seemingly
synonymous terms found in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī (namely vā, vibhāṣā and anya-
tarasyām), explaining them as having different grammatical meanings, in a way
that had been totally overseen by traditional Pāṇinian scholarship.
Until now,many interpreters have translated the terms relating to the concepts
standing on the side of śabda (for instance, śabda, pada, vacana, vācaka and so on)
as ‘word’¹⁴ and the terms of the artha group (i.e., the ones listed at the beginning of
the present section) as ‘meaning’ or as ‘object’, ‘meaning’, ‘thing’ and so on within
the same study and with no further explanation. This attitude is very widespread,
so that the following examples are only indicative and are not meant as a criticism
of the authors involved. Within Arnold (2006) — which is a very interesting at-
tempt todiscuss Indian linguistic issues aspart of philosophyof language (Wittgen-
stein, Fodor, Husserl, Augustine and many other authors are quoted and utilised),
artha is for instance translated neutrally as ‘point’ (fn. 9, quoting Dunne 2004),
then as ‘object’ (fn. 9 and p. 436), ‘meaning’ (p. 427), ‘external object’ (fn. 50),
‘thing’ (fn. 68) and ‘referent’ (p. 460 and p. 465, where in the same quotation artha
is unproblematically translated once as ‘referent’ and once as ‘meaning’). Note that
some of these terms are also used to translate other Sanskrit words, e.g. ‘thing’
translates vastu in fn. 9 and at p. 436 and p. 445 (thus somehow weakening the
speciϐic epistemological strength of the point Dharmakı̄rti and Prajñākaragupta
are making in the quoted passages). Arnold further explains that Dignāga points
at deϐining what is the sense of words, and Dharmakı̄rti their reference (Arnold
2006: 421). Should these English terms interpret their different understanding of
artha?
We think that it is now time to try to reproduce the more sophisticated Indian
linguistic thought in adequate terms and to give up these naı̈f translations. We are
preparing a longer study devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the various terms
¹³Though an adjective, bāhya can also be used on its own in the sense of ‘external object’. ‘External’
means ‘external to cognition’ (see below, section 2.7.6).
¹⁴Although śabda is found also in reference to speciϐic phonemes or of longer linguistic expressions.
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related to the semantic ϐield of ‘word’ and ‘phoneme’. Here we will, instead, focus
on the problem of reference: the relation between language and reality. While do-
ing so, we will also try to dismiss the implicit assumption of naı̈f referentialism as
the best interpretative clue of Jayanta’s, and generally Indian, philosophy of lan-
guage. Please note that we are not claiming that contemporary linguistics can tell
us how to interpret Jayanta, but that enhancing our linguistic awareness may help
us appreciate the depth of Jayanta’s argumentation.
2.5 Word, meaning and referent?
For Jayanta, the possibility of using language in order to communicate knowledge
wasbasedon the ϐixed relationsholdingbetween linguistic expressions, theirmean-
ings and the reality they depict. In other words, reality determines the truth value
of the linguistic expressions (as contemporary referentialists would say). In the
following pages we will examine this point in further detail.
We start from a terminological stipulation. We will consistently translate the
Sanskrit terms jāti and sāmānya (about which see also below, section 2.6.2) with
natural kind, thus avoiding the usual translation, namely universal, which points to
a similar disputewithin contemporary philosophy, but has themajor disadvantage
of having a very different meaning in modern linguistics. We only use natural kind
in order to denote those classes that exist independently of the classiϐicator’smind.
In fact, aswewill see in the next paragraph, Jayanta andhisMı̄māṃsā interlocutors
maintained that jātis exist ontologically and that they can be known and spoken
of.¹⁵ By contrast, their Buddhist opponents maintain that jātis are only made up
and do not correspond to any external state of affairs. Before the present article,
the term natural kind has been employed for translating jāti and sāmānya already
by S. H. Phillips (1995) and by J. Ganeri (2011a).
2.6 Language and reality according to Jayanta
2.6.1 The Buddhist challenge
Why could Jayanta not just say that the meaning of a linguistic expression simply
equals the external entity (thus, leaving the intermediary role of the mind alto-
gether out of the picture)? In other words, why could he not adhere to the naı̈f
theory of a rigid one-to-one correspondence between linguistic expressions and
real objects (see Figure 1)?
If one looks at the main theories of language in the 20th c., both Frege’s and
Saussure’s approaches to language assume the untenability of this naı̈f view as
their point of departure (Frege arguing againstMilleanismwhile Saussure refuting
the idea ofwords as labels of things). In the Indian context, Jayanta had to take into
¹⁵A comparison with the theory of universals by D. M. Armstrong (1978) seems appropriate, at ϐirst
glance. However, “Armstrong completely rejects the identiϐication of universals with the meanings of
general terms and thus rejects the inference from themeaningfulness of a general term to the existence
of a corresponding universal” (Sanford 1980: 69), so that his theorisation is of little use in a discussion
on language, which is our main concern in the present paper.
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language mind
reality
Figure 1: Naı̈f referentialism
account the sophisticated objections against this view coming from the Buddhist
side. These objections start from a standpoint opposite to that of naı̈f referential-
ism, and the anti-referentialist and antirealist stances are taken to their extreme
consequences. In fact, the Buddhists epistemologists tried to solve the problem of
reference by hypothesizing the nonexistence of any reality external to cognition,
or — at least — by postulating that all our conceptual knowledge regards mental
categories, see Figure 2.
language mind
reality
Figure 2: Buddhist mentalism
To sum up, the question is whether the objects and categories to which a lan-
guage refers, have an autonomous existence transcending the humanmind (a sort
of “referential realism”), or are creations of the latter (mentalism leading to nomi-
nalism).¹⁶
Several powerful Buddhist objections occupy a big part of NM 5. In this book,
Jayanta ϐirst let a Buddhist (possibly Dignāga himself) speak, next let the Mı̄māṃ-
saka respondent (corresponding to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) reply, and then again pre-
sented a more elaborate rebuttal of Kumārila’s criticism by a Buddhist opponent
(possibly Dharmottara). Last comes Jayanta’s ϐinal opinion.¹⁷
The Buddhist epistemologists used the theory of apoha as a counter-theory
against those schools that supported the referential realism in dealing with lan-
guage.¹⁸ This theory claims that the meaning of linguistic expressions is not a pos-
itive content, but rather the apoha ‘exclusion’ of whatever is different (noteworthy
is the striking parallelism between this theory and Saussure’s idea of the opposi-
tional nature of the linguistic sign, see p. ??). This is justiϐied on the basis of an
accurate analysis of all other possible candidates for the meaning of linguistic ex-
¹⁶Please note that this referential realism is not tantamount to the naı̈f referentialism described in
the Figure 1. It does not, in other words, deny altogether any role to the mind (as in the extreme form
of naı̈f referentialism rejected by Jayanta, see above section 2.3). Rather, it emphasises the presence of
a consistent link with external reality.
¹⁷See, respectively, Kataoka (2011, 2008, 2009) and Kataoka (2010). For Kumārila’s refutation of the
Buddhist view and the Buddhist refutation of Kumārila see Watson and Kataoka (2013).
¹⁸For a ϐirst introduction to the vast literature on apoha see the present volume and Siderits, Tille-
mans, and Chakrabarti (2011). For further details on apoha in Jayanta, see the studies and translations
by Kataoka mentioned in fn. 17.
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pressions.¹⁹ All have been proven by the Buddhist epistemologists either not to
exist (the natural kinds), or not to be attainable through language (the ultimate
particulars). Thus, the Buddhists conclude that there is no straightforward link be-
tween a given linguistic expression and a certain real entity, and the only plausible
interpretation of the word-meaning consists in considering it as the exclusion of
all other meanings.
But how can language perform its communicative function, if it is disconnected
from real entities? According to the Buddhist epistemologists, there is no stable
and necessary connection between language and reality (unlike the one holding,
for example, between ϐire and smoke).²⁰ Language, therefore, refers to reality in
an indirect way, which is considered ultimately unreliable. In fact, since the link is
not necessary, it cannot be true. What is at play in this case is the chief concern of
the Buddhist epistemological school according to which only what is intrinsically
rational can be real and no indeterminacy (like, instead, in the Bhāṭṭa Mı̄māṃsā
theory of the ultimate difference-and-non-difference between universal and indi-
vidual) can be tolerated. Nonetheless, linguistic expressions retain a loose connec-
tion with the object referred to, thus making it possible for the listener to act suc-
cessfully on the basis of language. Aswewould put it today, the language is vaguely,
or rather non-deterministically connected to reality, but nonetheless one can act
successfully on the basis of it.²¹
2.6.2 Jayanta’s reply
It is worth remembering that theNM sections dedicated to language arewithin the
larger frame of the discussion about pramāṇas ‘instruments for acquiring knowl-
edge’. Accordingly, Jayanta’s epistemological concern made him favour an expla-
nation in which language refers to reality in a non-random way. This concern is
explicit in his polemics against the Buddhist apoha, to which Jayanta dedicated a
big portion of his NM 5.
¹⁹The refuted options are: jāti or sāmānya ‘natural kinds’, avāntarasāmānya ‘intermediate natural
kinds’, vyakti ‘individual objects’, sāṅkarya ‘aggregates’. “Intermediate” natural kinds are sub-groups
within the natural kinds. The example (mentioned at NM: 14) is that of the SƵ ābaleya type of cows. Ag-
gregates are mentioned at NM: 8c as an alternative to the ontological concept of natural kinds existing
independently of the individuals instantiating them.
²⁰The example of the smoke as a consequence, and a sign, of the ϐire, frequently used by the Indian
philosophers, recalls the analogous example made by Ch. Peirce in deϐining the so-called index, one of
the three types of signs. This could perhaps have been not a coincidence. Pierce could have read this
same example in Sextus Empiricus, a late Greek skeptic philosopher, who could have undergone some
Indian inϐluence, cf. Scharfstein (1998: 235fn).
²¹As explained in a beautiful simile (of Buddhist origin) in NM 5, the language would refer to the
world like the light of a jewel appearing from the keyhole and which one mistakes for the jewel itself
(NM 5, Kataoka 2009: 461, §4.3). After having seen it, the observer rushes to the room in order to
seize the jewel s/he is convinced to have seen. In fact, by opening the door, the observer does ϐind a
jewel, although it is not the jewel s/he was convinced to have seen. Thus, the observer was lead by an
intrinsically unreliable signal (the light of the jewel, which s/hemisunderstood as the jewel itself), but
the erroneous signal retained some connection with reality (after all, it was the light of the jewel that
the observer misconstrued as the jewel itself, and not, e.g., the light of a candle). This loose connection
is, however, strong enough to lead one’s actions to their goal (in this case, obtaining the jewel).
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Since —within NM 5— the Mı̄māṃsaka objector replies to the Buddhist epis-
temologist by upholding the real existence of jātis ‘general class’ (from jan- ‘to be
born’, cognate to the Latin word genus, used in Aristotelian philosophy with simi-
lar purposes), also called sāmānya (lit. ‘commonness’, abstract from samāna ‘com-
mon’),²² the whole discussion displays a realist vs. nominalist (or antirealist) op-
position. Jayanta considers both approaches’ arguments, and replies to the nomi-
nalists with a comparably powerful argumentation, while, as a matter of fact, he
ends up overruling both the Mı̄māṃsā referential realism and the Buddhist nom-
inalism by taking into account several elements of the Buddhist approach, espe-
cially of its pars destruens. For instance, Jayanta could not accept the “illusionistic”
output of the Buddhist nominalism (if everything is just cognition, it could be eas-
ily concluded that everything is an illusion), but at the same time he criticised the
Mı̄māṃsā claim that linguistic expressions only refer to sāmānyas ‘natural kinds’
(see below, section 2.7.5, for Jayanta’s solution).
What is at stake in the dispute? From the point of view of Jayanta, accepting
the apoha theory would endanger all certainty about the connection between lan-
guage and the world. How can one reconcile the absence of a necessary link and
the need for an epistemological connection between language and reality? In other
words: if the language is indeterminate, then how could it be an instrument of
knowledge? The issue of indeterminacy could be solved by formulating a formal
type of language which left aside the intricacies of the ordinary language of the ev-
eryday communication. However, only at a later stage of Indian philosophy, namely
in Navya Nyāya, will scholars resort to a formal language of absolute exactness, to
be used as an analytical tool in order to analyse reality and ordinary language. By
contrast, in the preceding period authors such as Kumārila and Jayanta deemed it
of extreme importance to accommodate ordinary language and experience within
their epistemologies (see Freschi 2010; McCrea forthcoming).
Thus, part of Jayanta’s answer consists in relying largely on the context as a
powerful disambiguation tool. Consequently, Jayanta discussed at length (in the
second third of NM 6) the anvitābhidhānavāda ‘theory of the denotation [of the
sentence-meaning] through [words] which have been already connected’ and the
abhihitānvayavāda ‘theory of the connection of already denoted [word-meanings]
[in order to convey the sentence meaning]’, that is the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa
Mı̄māṃsā viewson sentencemeaning,whichbothuphold the view that the context
of a sentence conditions the meaning conveyed by each word (on these theories
see Chakrabarti 1989; Matilal and Sen 1988; Sen 2005).
In order to face the issue of a term’s referential indeterminacy vs. the neces-
sity of exactness in communication, Jayanta recurred to a complex scheme (see
Table 1 on p. 29), which allows language to retain some vagueness and still be pre-
cise enough for the efϐicacy of communication. His implicit adoption of the scheme
suggests that the ultimate individuality of each concrete object does not need to
be precisely grasped by language for the purpose of ordinary communication: it is
enough to understand that one is talking about a certain individual; then, contex-
²²As alreadymentioned (see section 2.5), both terms will be translated in the following with natural
kind.
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tual and/or pragmatic elements can help in case of ambiguity.
2.7 Internal evidence against terminological synonymity
in NM 5
We can turn now to the main discussion of this paper, namely the question of the
apparent synonymitywithin Jayanta’s terminology.What follows is a short inquiry
on the usage, within NM 5, of the terms listed in the section 2.4.
As is often the case in scholarly analyses, a reader will now have to face the
paradox of questions:²³ unless one has a preliminary understanding of what is
at stake, it is extremely difϐicult to understand the answer one receives. Thus, if
someone asks what an internal combustion engine is, s/he will hardly understand
an answer which deals with wankel, strokes and diesel cycle. In our case, the re-
sults of our investigation will be discussed in the section 2.8, so that readers less
interested in the intricacies of Sanskrit terms and more interested in our general
linguo-philosophical conclusions can refer directly to that section and then come
back to this section in order to see how we arrived at those results.
2.7.1 vācya
vācya ‘signiϐied’ is usedwhenever Jayanta needed an opposing category for vācaka
‘expresser’, and denotes any kind of signiϐied meaning. It pertains to the sphere of
language and does not necessarily entail the existence of a reality towhich it corre-
sponds. In other words, all linguistic meanings are vācya, and the question of their
truth value is not even raised. Accordingly, vācya can denote a non-referring, i.e.
purely linguistic meaning, such as that of a grammatical element (see NM: 69, 80,
81 et passim. ). Both vācaka and vācya are therefore located on the abstract level
of language, and seemingly correspond to the Saussurean terms signiϔier and signi-
ϔied, i.e. the phonological form and the cognitive content of a linguistic expression.
2.7.2 vastu and vāstava
For Jayanta, vastu denotes a content that has been ascertained through an act of
valid cognition. Rather than to Saussure’s signiϔied (which is understood as plainly
linguistic, regardless of any link to external reality), it resembles the contempo-
rary philosophical notion of propositional content in its being objective and truth-
functional.²⁴ vastu plays consequently a pivotal role in the framework of NM5 as it
guarantees the possibility to use language as an instrument conveying knowledge
about the world.
vastu is often used in SƵ āstric Sanskrit as a loose termmeaning ‘object’, not nec-
essarily a concrete one. It has, in fact, nothing of the intrinsic physicality of piṇḍa
²³About which see Varzi (2001) and Carpenter and Ganeri (2010).
²⁴There is no agreement among analytic philosophers on the precise nature of what amounts to a
proposition, and on whether it is real, mind-internal, or only linguistic. Here, we are using the term
propositional content for its purely epistemological value and donot presuppose any necessary relation
with a linguistic expression (as, on the contrary, contemporary philosophers usually do).
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(see section 2.7.4). Further, unlike artha, vastu is not necessarily bound to a lin-
guistic expression. Its main feature is to denote a knowable content which is also
epistemologically sound and non depending on the cogniser; i.e., a vastu is some-
thing that Popperwould classify into hisWorld 3. In otherwords, illusions, dreams
and other sources of erroneous cognition cannot be labelled vastu.
For instance, in the following statement a Buddhist opposes vastu to bāhyārtha
‘external object’ and uses the latter in an epistemologically neutral way:
Thus, when conceptual cognitions, which do not directly refer to real
entities (vastu), appear, common people have the erroneous concep-
tion: “I have cognized an external object (bāhyārtha), I have under-
taken an action towards it and I have obtained it”. ²⁵
Or, similarly, at the end of the same section:
But [apohas] are different from [jātis] in that the latter are not real
entities (vastu).²⁶
Accordingly, jātis are here said to be unreal conforming to the Buddhist nominalist
view. In contrast, apohas consist only of exclusions and are, thus, only a negation
of something else. apohas, therefore, do not denote an external referent. Rather,
they enable an epistemologically sound communication to occur, through the reg-
ulated exclusion of anything other than what is indirectly indicated through the
apoha. Thus, the external referents, such as the natural kinds, brought forward
by Mı̄māṃsakas and Naiyāyikas are unreal, according to the Buddhists, since they
are nothing but unwarranted postulations. By contrast, the exclusion denoted by
apoha is real (vāstava) from the point of view of epistemology, since it is grasped
through a valid act of cognition. Thus, given that apohas are qualiϐied as vastu by
the Buddhist opponents, one can conclude that being an external entity is not part
of thedeϐinition of vastu, whereas having a truth value is. Authors of a realist school
would, in fact, by contrast insist that jātis are real and that apohas are unreal, so
that one can conclude that being a vastu does not regard the ontology of things, but
rather only their epistemological aspect.
As it is apparent in this case, within Jayanta’s polemics against the Buddhists
on the existence of jātis, the terms vastu ‘real’ and avastu ‘non real’ were used by
the Buddhists with reference to, respectively, apoha and jāti, and then by Jayanta
with reference to, contrariwise, jāti and apoha. In fact, both sides agree that vastu
has a truth value (it leads to pramā ‘valid cognition’) and that it is actually known
through an act of valid cognition. However, they disagree as to its identiϐication.
²⁵evaṃ bāhyavastusaṃsparśaśūnyeṣu vikalpeṣu samullasiteṣu “bāhyo ’rtho mayā pratipannaḥ, tatra
cāhaṃ pravṛttaḥ, sa ca mayā prāptaḥ” ity abhimāno bhavati laukikānām. (NM 5, Kataoka 2009: 460,
§4.4). Kataoka and Watson translate as follows: “Thus, when conceptual cognitions, which lack con-
tact with external entities (vastu), appear, people have the erroneous conception: “I have cognized an
external object (artha), and I have taken action towards it, and I have obtained it” (??, ??).
²⁶avastutvakṛtas tu bhedaḥ || (NM 5, Kataoka 2009: 458, §5). For another translation, see ??, ??. The
Buddhist opponentmeans that one cannot criticise apohas like one has criticised the jātis as candidates
for expressing themeaningof aword, since the latter are just ϐictitiouspostulations,whereas the former
are correctly cognised as scientiϐic realities (as in Popper’s World 3).
18
For the Buddhists, only the ultimate particular,²⁷ the svalakṣaṇa, is a vastu (i.e.,
only the svalakṣaṇa is the real content grasped by a valid act of cognition), whereas
for Jayanta a vastu does not need to be a unique particular. It can, by contrast, be
instantiated in several particulars and be either an individual or a jāti (see Table 1
on p. 29). Consequently, the vastu is intrinsically simple for the Buddhists, whereas
itmight also be complex for Jayanta (whowas on this point followingKumārila, see
section 2.6.1).²⁸
At this point, one might object that the same entity cannot be both simple and
complex,²⁹ and the Buddhist opponents do indeed voice this objection with a sar-
castic remark about realists such as Kumārila, who maintain that the vastu is mul-
tiform in the sense that different entities can be said to be vastu:
[Buddhist:] The same thing which is a natural kind, is an individual
object, the same thing which is one, is many, the same thing which is
permanent, is impermanent, the same thing which exists does not ex-
ists: these are [just] the remainders of the Jains!³⁰
And [even] while this is being said, it is not appropriate:
If you (Kumārila) say that there is no contradiction because they
(natural kind and individual objects) are [actually] grasped (and
actual events supersedehypothetical contradictions), [we reply that]
it is not so, because they are not known in this way (i.e., it is not the
case that they are actually grasped, they are only later conceptual-
isations) |
In fact, it has been said that the eye-perception does not grasp a
recurring thing ||³¹
²⁷This term has been chosen here instead of ‘individual object’ since we have stipulated that the
term ‘individual’ is used in opposition to ‘universal’ or ‘natural kind’ (jāti or sāmānya), whereas the
svalakṣaṇa is the only reality and it is not the instantiation of something else. Furthermore, the term
‘object’ has beendroppedbecauseBuddhist epistemologists deny that eachperceptiblemoment should
be linked to an ontological substrate.
²⁸This point of Jayanta’s criticism of the Buddhists reminds us of a similar debate within the con-
temporary philosophy between those, most notably Russell, who claim that proper names conceal a
description, i.e., are complex entities, and those, notably Kripke and his followers, who admit the ex-
istence of linguistic expressions rigidly denoting one and only one entity, and therefore intrinsically
simple.
²⁹It is worth recalling that for the Buddhist epistemological school only single things, intrinsically
simple, are real, not the sets, categories or other complex entities (see fn. 27), so that the qualities of
‘simple’ and ‘complex’ cannot be validly said to refer as qualities to the same substrate.
³⁰The Buddhist is making fun of the Mı̄māṃsaka by claiming that he upholds multiple conϐlicting
views, as in the Jaina anekāntavāda, according to which mutually contradictory points of view can all
be simultaneously true. For a logical analysis of this approach from the viewpoint of contemporary
epistemology, see Ram-Prasad (2007).
³¹tad eva sāmānyaṃ, sa eva viśeṣaḥ, tad evaikaṃ, tad eva nānā, tad eva nityaṃ, tad evānityaṃ, tad
evāsti, tad eva nāsti iti jainocchiṣṭam idam ucyamānam eva na śobhate* — dṛṣṭatvān na virodhaś cet na
tathā tadavedanāt | uktaṃ hi nānuvṛttārthagrāhiṇī netradhīr iti || (NM: 9) *We are following the read-
ing found in the manuscript by SƵ itikaṇṭhasvāmin (described under its signature, BORI 390/1875–76
and with the siglum P, in Graheli 2012 and in Graheli 2011): jainocchiṣṭam idam ucyamānam eva na
śobhate. NM: 9 reads jainocchiṣṭam idam ucyate. ucyamānam api na śobhate and reports the reading
jainocchinnam in the manuscript it calls ga. We are grateful to Alessandro Graheli for this reading from
the manuscript BORI 390/1875–76, a copy of which is owned by the project “Metaphysik und Episte-
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Some pages later, Jayanta replied:
As forwhat has been said, namely that “It is illogical that in a single real
entity (vastu) two contradictory aspects (rūpa) simultaneously occur”,
this is also wrong. […]
Like the distinction of colours occurs in the case of a variegated
[spot] (which, though one, has several distinct aspects simultane-
ously occurring within it), |
in the sameway, one also distinguishes similarities and differences
of a real object (vastu) because of its manifoldness ||
Hence, since one distinguishes similarities and differences in this
non contradictory way, |
real objects (vastu) must have a double nature, like in the opinion
of the Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) || ³²
vāstava is used in NM 5 when Jayanta replies to the Buddhist criticism of the
jāti ‘natural kind’. Whereas the Buddhist considered the natural kind as an unwar-
ranted conceptualisation, Jayanta answered that it is vāstava ‘real’:
Even at the ϐirst connection of the sense faculty [with its object] one
understands the sameness [of two or more individuals] |
and [their] manifoldness. Hence, commonness and difference are both
real ||³³
Thus, the natural kind is real, i.e., it belongs to the reality (vastu) itself. It is not,
however, tantamount to the piṇḍa ‘concrete particular’. Rather, the natural kind,
which is epistemologically real, is instantiated (vṛt-) in the individual object,which,
in turn, corresponds to the concrete particular (see infra, Fig. 5).
vāstava is also found at the beginning of NM 5 while discussing the Buddhist
view that linguistic expressions do not “touch” (spṛś-) their arthas:
mologie des Nyāya III”, FWF P24388. For a list and an appraisal of the extant manuscripts of the NM,
see, respectively, Graheli 2012 and Graheli forthcoming.
³²yad apy abhihitam “itaretaraviruddharūpasamāveśa ekatra vastuni nopapadyate” iti, tad api na
samyak. […] yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanirgrahaḥ | citratvād vastuno ’py evaṃ bhedābhe-
dāvadhāraṇā || (NM 5, Kataoka 2010: 194–193, §3.1). varṇanirgrahaḥ is our conjecture, based on the
NMGBh. varṇanigrahaḥ is the reading adopted in Kataoka 2010, by K1, by the gamanuscript quoted in
NM and by the NMGBh, which, however, glosses it as if it had the preverb niḥ instead of ni (niṣkṛṣṭasya
varṇasya grahaṇam ‘the grasping of a colour extracted [from the variegated background]’). The other
witnesses in Kataoka (2010) have: varṇaniścayaḥ (NM, SƵ āstrı̄ Tailaṅga 1895–1896, probably a tacit
emendation of the editors) or varṇanirṇayaḥ (the overall unreliable manuscript A1 and the slightly
better Z1).
³³prathamākṣasannipāte tulyatvamavagamyate | nānātvaṃ ceti sāmānyabhedau dvāv api vāstavau ||
(Kataoka 2010: 196, §2.1). The onewe adopt here is the reading of themanuscript K1, which Kataoka’s
edition rejects as “unmetrical”, preferring instead prathamākṣanipāte ’pi of A1. However, A1 is overall
unreliable (as shown also by the fact that in all critical editions of the NM by Kataoka, this is possibly
the only time where its reading has been preferred over the ones of the other witnesses), and san-
nipāte ‘conjunction’ (found in all other witnesses, but without ’pi only in K1) makes much better sense
than nipāte ‘fall, ruin’. Last, the sequence of long-short-long (ragaṇa) in the 5th to 7th syllable is an ac-
ceptable vipulā to the standard anuṣṭubh. We are grateful to K. Kataoka for having discussed this issue
with us.
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[Buddhist:] Linguistic expressions do not touch (i.e., refer to, in an epis-
temologically sound way)³⁴ any real object (artha), since no real (vās-
tava) meaning of linguistic expression exists.³⁵
This probably means that linguistic expressions are not reliable, since they
have no necessary link with reality, either because their alleged referent (e.g. in-
dividuals, natural kinds, relations, etc.) is a sheer hypothesis, or because it lies be-
yond their reach. In fact, not even meanings understood as apohas can be thought
to relate directly to concrete entities, which are— according to the Buddhist epis-
temologists’ view— ephemeral and unrepeatable.
To sumup, the term vāstava qualiϐieswhatever is actually real andwhose truth
value can be ascertained, and hence ensures the epistemological validity of a cer-
tain act of knowledge. The vastu is the real object, the one which is rightly as-
certained through a correct use of our instruments of knowledge. According to
Jayanta, it is to this vastu that the aspects of individuality and the correspondence
to a natural kind belong. In order to ensure that linguistic communication is a
means of knowledge, this must ultimately lead to the knowledge of a vastu, a real
entity.
2.7.3 viṣaya
Unlike vastu, which denotes the object ascertained through an act of valid cogni-
tion, viṣayamight refer, for Jayanta, to each mental content, be it the content of an
instance of valid cognition or also the sphere of application of a hypothetical or
illusory one. Thus, the content of a dream or of an hallucination is a viṣaya, but by
no means a vastu. Accordingly, viṣayamight be used with reference to an external
object, but also to the content of a hypothetical statement, like one about a “horned
hare”. In this sense, viṣaya is a neutral term and only denotes the content of a men-
tal activity, without statingwhether this resulted in a valid cognition (as in the case
of vastu) or not. In short, viṣaya only refers to the mental activities and language,
with no link to ontology andwithout assuming that truth-value attribution should
be possible. On a similar vein, Ganeri translates it as “object of thought” (Ganeri
2011b: section 5.1) or as “propositional content” (Ganeri 2011b: section 2.1, n. 2).
We cannot fully agree with Ganeri’s last translation, since the term propositional
content is mostly used in contemporary philosophy for a truth-functional content,
for which we have established the equivalency to Sanskrit vastu (see above, be-
ginning of section 2.7.2). viṣaya seems rather similar to what Frege disregarded as
“mental representations”, and partly to Saussure’s signiϔication (although the latter
is limited to a concrete speech act, while visaya is not).
³⁴The critique to the Mı̄māṃsā theory of meaning insofar as linguistic expressions do not reach any
real referent (arthāsaṃsparśitva) has a key signiϐicance for the post-Kumārila debate on linguistics, see
Kataoka (2008: 210) for its presence in Jayanta. See also Freschi 2012 for its depiction in SƵ ālikanātha’s
Nītipatha, 2 et passim. The connection of arthawith vāstava in these contexts (see the present passage
and, e.g., asadarthaviṣayatvam evedam uktam bhavati, śabdārthasya vāstavasyābhāvāt, NMMysore 1, p.
236) made us interpret artha in this passage as “real object” in this context.
³⁵vāstavasya śabdārthasyāvidyamānatvād arthāsaṃsparśinaḥ śabdā iti (NM: 3).
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2.7.4 piṇḍa and vyakti (or viśeṣa)
For Jayanta, piṇḍa denotes the irreducible particular, which cannot be attained by
language, nor can it be graspedby an act of valid cognition. It is nonetheless needed
in order to endow with an ontological anchorage the objects referred to by lan-
guage and grasped by cognition. By contrast, vyakti denotes the same particular,
but only insofar as it is an instantiation, or a token, of a jāti ‘natural kind’.
In śāstric Sanskrit, piṇḍa generally denotes a concrete entity, having a corpo-
real mass. In Jayanta, piṇḍa is unambiguously used to denote single concrete par-
ticulars existing in the external world. In this respect, a piṇḍa is different from a
vyakti. The latter is an individual — yet abstract — entity, opposed to a jāti. The
former is only a possible external purport for the jāti’s concrete instantiation. Lan-
guage cannot refer to the concrete particular entities (piṇḍas) in a non-mediate
way: the linguistic reference is directed to a different level, that of vyaktis, i.e. indi-
viduals belonging to some natural kinds, which are primarily accessible through
language.
The standard translation of vyakti could be ‘individual’, which nicely reϐlects
the opposition between vyakti and jāti, since the latter can be translated as ‘uni-
versal’. However, the translation ‘referent’ (Frege’s Bedeutung) is preferable when
the language-oriented nature of the use of vyakti is prevalent.³⁶
Note that viśeṣa, when employed technically and not just in the sense of ‘speci-
ϐicity’, is used in the context of NM5 (e.g., NM: 8d, 30, 32, 38, 39, 59–61) in a similar
way, that is, in opposition to sāmānya, andwill be consequently translated as a syn-
onym of vyakti.
Particular has been chosen to translate piṇḍa because it is often used, together
with the adjectiveultimate, to translate theBuddhist term svalakṣaṇa,which shares
some important featureswith piṇḍa in this polemic.We have further characterised
the piṇḍa as a ‘concrete particular’ in order to stress its corporeality.
In order to better focus on how piṇḍa and vyakti are distinguished, it is useful
to see the sort of objections their distinction is meant to answer. These objections
come from the side of the Buddhist epistemologists, who object to the existence of
a jāti in the following way:
[Buddhist: The natural kind cannot be the epistemological object of
conceptual knowledge] because, once this (the individual, vyakti) is
not grasped, there is no notion of that (its natural kind). For something
is distinct from something else if it is grasped even if the other one is
not grasped, like a cloth is distinct from a pot. But the natural kind is
not grasped if the individual is not grasped. Hence, it is not distinct
from that.
[Realist:] It (the natural kind) is not perceived once that (individual) is
not grasped, because the natural kind exists within that.
[Buddhist:] No, because [this sort of] existence is illogical. Does the
³⁶Within contemporary philosophy, similarly to the status of proposition (see section 2.7.2), it is also
under debate whether the referent is language-speciϐic or exists ontologically.
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natural kind exist in each concrete individual in its entirety? Or with a
part [of itself]? Both are illogical.³⁷
Here, theBuddhist speaker iswell awareof the inherence-relationwhichNaiyāyikas
believe to hold between individuals and natural kinds andwants to show its unten-
ability bydropping an element of the circuit (the individual, vyakti) and askinghow
the natural kind can directly exist within a concrete particular. Note that he starts
with a non-controversial point (the natural kind is only grasped in concomitance
with an individual) and then extends this case to the existence of the natural kind
only within a concrete particular.
Jayanta’s answer, some pages thereafter, repeats that natural kinds are only
grasped through an individual, but explains that this only happens because the
natural kind is empirically present (vṛtti) only within the individual; but this does
not mean, so Jayanta, that it is (bhāva) also ontologically inseparable from it. Pres-
ence is not the same as essence, and what is concretely the case (the fact that X
is only present within Y) does not exhaust the ontological level.³⁸ In other words,
the distinction of the two levels, i.e. vyakti and piṇḍa, enabled Jayanta to reject the
Buddhist criticism of the notion of jāti ‘natural kind’, based on its occurrence only
within concrete particulars.
As for [the objection] “[The natural kind does not exist,] since there
is no notion of it once the [individual is not grasped], since it is not
grasped as having a distinct place”, in this regard, the reason is that
the natural kind has that (the individual) as substrate, not that it does
not exist. Since the natural kind is present (vṛtti) within the individ-
ual, it is not grasped as having a distinct place once this (individual)
is not grasped, but not because [it, the natural kind] does not exist as
separate from it (individual). […] If you say that then it (natural kind)
would not be grasped in another concrete particular, what shall we
do?Whom shall we criticise? [Obviously you, the Buddhist, who fail to
grasp the distinction between vyakti and piṇḍa].³⁹
³⁷tadagrahe tadbuddhyabhāvāt. yad dhi yato vyatiriktaṃ, tat tasminn agṛhyamāṇe ’pi gṛhyate, ghaṭād
va paṭaḥ. na ca vyaktāv anupalabhyamānāyāṃ jātir upalabhyate. yasmān na tato ’sau bhidyate.
tadvṛttitvāt sāmānyasya tadagrahe tadanupalabdhir iti cet, na. vṛttyanupapatteḥ. kiṃ pratipiṇḍaṃ kārt-
snyena vartate jātiḥ. utaikadeśena? iti. dvayam api cānupapannam (NM: 7).
³⁸Note that the polysemy of the verb ‘to be’ (denoting both the ontological essence and the physical
presence), that was the source of a big deal of confusion also in the philosophic debate of the European
tradition is here exploited by the Buddhist opponent but carefully avoided by Jayanta, who explained
the relation between jāti and vyakti as that holding between a class X and its element x? .
³⁹ yat tu deśabhedenāgrahaṇāt tadagrahe tadbuddhyabhāvāt iti, tatra tadāśritatvaṃ kāraṇaṃ jāteḥ,
nāsattvam. vyaktivṛttitvāj jāteḥ pṛthag deśatayānupalambhas tadagrahe*, na punas tadatiriktāyā ab-
hāvād iti. […] piṇḍāntare tadupalambho na syād iti cet, kiṃ kurmaḥ. kam upālabhāmahe, NM 5, Kataoka
2010: 192–191, §§3.2.2–3). *NM reads tadagrahe tadagraho vā instead of tadagrahe, which is the read-
ing of K1. The reading tadagrahe tadagraho vā is supported indirectly also by that of the ka, kha and
gha manuscripts whose readings are reported in the apparatus of NM, and by that of SƵ āstrı̄ Tailaṅga
1895–1896 and A1, which all read tadagraho vā. However, the reading tadagrahe tadagraho vā seems
redundant and the vā in the reading tadagraho vā does not make sense. K1 also adds jāter before ab-
hāvād. This might be a gloss and anyway speaks in favour of the copyist of K1, who always tried to
understands the text. kam upālabhāmahe is only found in K1 and it makesmuch better sense than kam
upalabhāmahe ‘Which one should we perceive?’.
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In the following, we shall see how Jayanta distinguished within the ontological
level a cognitively graspable level (the vyakti and jāti that we can actually know)
and the irreducible concrete particulars (the piṇḍas). Thus, from the point of view
of their essence, a jāti, as a natural kind, is distinguished from the vyakti, which is
an instance of the former; although, from the point of view ofwhere it is concretely
present, the jāti is instantiatedwithin a piṇḍa.⁴⁰ As Jayanta put it later in NM 5, the
piṇḍa is like deha ‘body’ in regard to ātman ‘soul’, which exists only within it. If we
want to know about the soul, we need to know that it has the body as its substrate,
but the body in itself does not tell us anything about the soul and can be completely
neglected if one focuses on the soul (Kataoka 2010: 186, §3.3.1).
In other words, the Buddhists wanted to radically reduce existence in general
to independent existence, proven by independent perceptibility, and accordingly
denied the possibility of the existence of natural kinds, since they are not inde-
pendently perceivable and are only — if at all — perceived in concomitance with
individuals. By contrast, Jayanta was ready to admit also subordinate sorts of exis-
tence, such as the inherence of the quality X in a substrate Y.
It is also noteworthy that Jayanta’s understanding of vṛtti ‘presence’ slightly
differs from the Buddhist one. The Buddhists denied the possibility of the natu-
ral kind existing within each concrete particular because they understood vṛtti as
the physical existence of an ultimate entity, which cannot be repeated. By contrast,
Jayanta understood it (as he will state immediately thereafter, see below) as the
inherence holding, e.g., between a quality and a set of individual quality-bearers.
Thus, according to Jayanta, vṛtti is repeatable and it is not the case that once a jāti
is included in a vṛtti-relation, it is exhausted (as claimed by the Buddhist in NM 5,
vv. 3–4).
This vṛtti is the same that [holds] between parts and part-bearer, and
between qualities and quality-bearer. It will be shown later that these
two (part and part-bearer and quality and quality-bearer) have differ-
ent meanings. […] But they do not have a difference of place (i.e., sub-
strate).⁴¹
To sum up, the term piṇḍa denotes the concrete particular pieces of reality
which are not captured by linguistic expressions. The term vyakti, on the other
hand, seems to be a very close equivalent to the contemporary notion of referent
(an individual that is linguistically opposed to a general class, namely meaning).
2.7.5 artha
artha in Jayanta is the most polysemous term on the list mentioned above. It can
be generally translated as ‘meaning’, since it is usedwhenever Jayanta did not need
⁴⁰One can also ϐind statements in Jayanta about the fact that the jāti is present in many vyaktis. How-
ever, these statements are found within the Buddhist vs. realist polemics, where the Buddhist refuses
to accept the distinction of vyakti and piṇḍa, see the next passage quoted. In other such cases of seem-
ing conϐlation, these statements focus on the jāti vs. vyakti opposition rather than describing a concrete
state of affairs.
⁴¹avayavāvayavinor guṇaguṇinoś ceyam eva vṛttiḥ. tayor arthāntaratvam upariṣṭād darśayiṣyate. […]
deśabhedaś ca tayor nāsti, NM 5, Kataoka 2010: 190–189, §3.2.4.
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or want to specify whether he was talking about a mental content (in which case
he would have used viṣaya), or about a valid cognition (in which case he would
have used vastu). The use of artha also allowed Jayanta to leave out the question
whether the object is external to cognition (in which case he would have spoken
of bāhyārtha or used the term piṇḍa) and also whether it is a vyakti ‘individual’
or a jāti ‘natural kind’. Last, artha, unlike vācya, allowed Jayanta not to settle the
connection with epistemology and ontology.
artha is a very common term in SƵ āstric Sanskrit, where it is used in the four
ϐields of linguistics (as ‘meaning’), epistemology (as ‘cognised content’), deontics
(as ‘purpose’) and — although in a less prominent way — ontology (as ‘object’).
It is also used as a kind of placeholder-noun together with an adjective (think of
bāhyārtha discussed in section 2.7.6), in which cases it can be even omitted in
translation. Indian philosophy tends to approach language while having in view
at the same time what we would call “ontology”, “deontics” and “epistemology”,
and the four domains are thought to be strictly connected. As already hinted at
(see section 2.6.2), Jayanta in fact stressed the need for language to be a reliable
instrument of knowledge through which one can acquire notions about reality.
Consequently, therewill always be plenty of examples of generic and seemingly
non technical uses of the termartha. Furthermore, it is at timesdifϐicult to seewhat
is Jayanta’s own distinctive usage of artha. First of all, Jayanta’s style is often inϐlu-
enced by his sources. Next, Jayanta, inherited fromMı̄māṃsā the usage of artha as
‘goal’, ‘purpose’⁴² and fromNyāya andMı̄māṃsā an epistemological usage of artha
in the context of thedeϐinition of perceptual knowledge, asmeaning ‘the real object
of a valid act of cognition’. However, looking at Jayanta’s usage of arthawithin the
siddhānta ‘conclusive view’ (i.e., outside the passageswhere a Buddhist or another
opponent is speaking) we can establish what follows.
In the śāstric usage preceding Jayanta, artha tends to deϐine the meaning of a
word, often implicitly assumed to be identical with its referent, similarly to what
happens in contemporary referentialism. This does not mean, however, that for
Jayanta the artha is a concrete individual existing in the external world, as a sim-
plistic version of the referentialismmight claim. For instance, in a passage quoted
above, section 2.7.4 (NM 5, Kataoka 2010: §3.2.4), Jayanta stated that although the
sāmānya is actually attestable only within a vyakti ‘individual’, both sāmānya and
individual have distinct arthas. This proves that artha cannot simply be a concrete
individual. In fact, within a single individual there are two distinct cases of con-
crete reference: a vyakti and the jāti instantiated in it, i.e. the individual and the
natural kind which inheres in it.
Furthermore, when Jayanta used artha in a technical way, he focused his inves-
tigation on the question: “What feature makes an object ϐit to be linguistically (or
cognitively) grasped, i.e., to be an artha?” Jayanta’s explicit answer is that the ob-
ject of a linguistic expression is the vyakti tadvān ‘individual endowed with that
(its natural kind)’, i.e., the individual insofar as it is endowed with the distinctive
features of its jāti (for a full-ϐledged discussion of Jayanta’s answer to the question
⁴²See, e.g., NM 4, tad[=veda]arthānuṣṭhāna ‘the implementation of the goals [the means to attain
which are prescribed] in the Veda’ (Kataoka 2004: 213).
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around which NM 4–5 are organized, namely “What is the artha of a linguistic ex-
pression?”, see infra, section 2.8). In fact, a concrete individual can only be grasped
through language insofar as it displays the characteristics of themember of a class.
Else, one would need as many words as there are individuals which inhabit, have
inhabited or will inhabit our world. Therefore, artha is a doublefaced term: it be-
longs to the realm of concrete linguistic acts (not unlike the Saussurean signiϔica-
tion, and Gricean “speakers’s meaning”), but it exists only as far as some abstract
class (Saussurean signiϔied) deϐines it.
2.7.6 bāhya and bāhyārtha
The external entities are referred to by Jayanta as bāhya, which is used as an ad-
jective or a nominalised adjective to denotewhatever exists outside cognition (see
immediately below).
More often than not, bāhya qualiϐies artha, which conϐirms itself as the most
neutral term, a sort of placeholder (as in the English thing in clauses like “it’s a
father thing” or “the little things”), which leaves the whole stress on the adjective.
Consider, for instance:
Then, you have denied the external objects, like a Buddhist.⁴³
For the same reason, viṣaya can also be used together with bāhya (e.g., bāhya-
viṣayapramitiṣu, NM 2, NM: 183). Several examples of this use can be found in
the section on the Buddhist conception of apoha (NM 5, edited in Kataoka 2009).
There, after a ϐirst Buddhist opponent (probably close to Dignāga) and Kumārila’s
reply, a different Buddhist explains that the reply is misplaced, since:
The apoha is neither internal nor external. Rather, it is different from
cognition and from [its] object (artha).⁴⁴
The respondent will reply that:
What ultimately does not exist either internally or externally |
that does not exist at all!⁴⁵
This might seem an obvious remark, but it points to a denial of the possibility that
there is an extraordinary status forapoha. This addressesDharmottara’s claim that
apoha is neither external nor internal, i.e., “only existing within one’s cognition”
(see Kataoka 2009).
In this way, the respondent also conϐirms that bāhya/bahir is used as an anto-
nym of jñāna ‘cognition’ and denotes whatever is not of cognitive nature. Thus,
⁴³bāhyārthanihnavas tarhi tvayā saugatavat kṛtaḥ (NM 1, v. 60, NM: 56).
⁴⁴nāyam āntaro na bāhyo ’pohaḥ, kintu jñānārthābhyām anya eva (NM 5, Kataoka 2010: 473–472,
§2). See also infra, section 2
⁴⁵nanu yad vidyate nāntar na bahiḥ paramārthataḥ | tan na vidyata eveti (NM 5, Kataoka 2010: 472,
§2.1).
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within the polemic against the Buddhist Yogācārins, who claim that everything ex-
ists only as cognition, bāhya asserts the existence of something also outside cogni-
tion.⁴⁶ Nothing else is added about the epistemological status of something bāhya
(the epistemological status is rather the focus of the term vastu), nor about its be-
ing an individual, nor about its concrete materiality.
2.8 A tentative solution
artha can be used in order to denote themeaning of any linguistic expression, from
morphemes to whole sentences, independently of whether it has a direct corre-
spondence in the external world or not. Jayanta could in fact have thought of the
artha of a pada as something external, whereas the same would not have applied
to the artha of a sentence or, most of all, to the artha of a prescriptive sentence. In
fact, the latter can not correspond to anything deϐinite in the external world.⁴⁷
And even in the case of a single pada ‘word’, what does it mean that it has
an artha which is tantamount to an external object? The question leads back to
a pet-issue among Indian philosophers (as well as among many European ones),
namely that of the meaning and/or reference of nouns (i.e. the terms of contempo-
rary philosophers, which include proper names and deϐinite descriptions, rather
than bare substantives). Do they denote an individual, a natural kind, an ākṛti ‘con-
ϐiguration’,or an individual insofar as it is part of a natural kind? To have them de-
note an individual— rigidly, we would say today— is generally considered unten-
able,⁴⁸ but Jayanta refuted also the opposite stance, upheld by Kumārila, namely
that words can only denote a natural kind, not singular individuals. In contrast, he
suggested that the artha of aword is an individual insofar as it is endowedwith the
characteristics which make it a member of a natural kind, shortly a vyakti tadvān
‘an individual endowed with that (its natural kind)’.⁴⁹ In this sense, one could say
that the referent is for Jayanta the vyakti, although the meaning is the individual’s
natural kind.⁵⁰
⁴⁶A similar instance of the same opposition is: “Some say: the sentence-meaning is a cognitionwhich
has the appearance of the complex of the words’ meaning, since an external sentence-meaning is im-
possible” (kecid ācakṣate — bāhyasya vākyarthasyāsaṃbhavāt padārthasaṃsarganirbhāsaṃ jñānam
eva vākyārtha iti, NM: 5.69).
⁴⁷Rather, according to the Mı̄māṃsā point of view, a prescriptive sentence denotes the hierarchical
relation of the elements it mentions in view of an action to be realised (NM: 5.74). Thus, it cannot by
deϐinition correspond to anything already existing.
⁴⁸One of the reasons is that if a word already denoted the individual, then we would understand a
single thing through each word, e.g., we would grasp a single cow, different from all other cows, when
we hear the word cow; see the NM 5 text edited in Kataoka (2009: 192, §1.4).
⁴⁹Below, we refer to this concept by the compound term jātivadvyakti ‘individual endowed with the
natural kind’.
⁵⁰On Jayanta’s ϐinal view, see also Ganeri (1996: 13), which emphasises the value of the deictic:
An utterance of “tree” should be thought of as having two components, a demonstrative
element, expressed by a deictic pronoun “this”, and a qualifying, predicative component,
expressed by the possessive afϐix attached to the name of a property, “…has treehood”.
In other words, the nominal “tree” is analysed as having a ‘deep’ structure “this, having-
tree-hood” or “this, (which) is-a-tree”. The deictic pronoun ensures that the expression
is token-reϐlexive, different utterances referring to different, demonstratively indicated
objects.
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Jayanta also held on to theMı̄māṃsakas’ emphasis on language as being linked
to external reality, and consequently as being able to communicate knowledge.
However, “an individual (vyakti, and not piṇḍa) endowed with a natural kind” can-
not be straightforwardly described as an external object (such as a concrete pot).
Hence, one might suggest that, like necessarily in the case of sentences, even for
words, the artha is a mental entity. This does not mean that it is dependent on
the subjectivity of each individual speaker. Psychology has nothing to do with it.
Rather, natural kinds are innate to the nature of things but they are not available
to perception as separate from the individuals, and can only be graspedwithin the
individuals in which they inhere.
Themainproblem in reconstructing Jayanta’s thought in awaywhich canbeun-
derstandable also for contemporary linguists and philosophers lies in the fact that
the dichotomies existing for the latter two did not exist for Jayanta and vice versa.
Not only the answers are different, but also the problems are differently framed.
Within Jayanta’s — and possibly many other classical Indian authors’ — thought,
the dichotomies at play are the following ones:
• cognitive vs. linguistic: it is not necessarily the case that a known object is
also accessible to language;
• cognitive vs. epistemological: Jayanta was quite clear about the distinction
between cognitions in general (includingwrong cognitions, illusions, dream-
images, etc.) and pieces of knowledge (acquired through the usage of means
of knowledge);
• ontological vs. epistemological: although, usually, what one knows exists,
and, vice versa, what exists can be known, the relation is not in every case
straightforward and one-to-one. There can be residual things which cannot
beknown, although theyprovide anontological anchorage forwhatweknow.
The basic system of Jayanta’s thought about artha can be summarised in the
Figure 3.
word artha
referent
(e.g. an individual pot)
(deϐined as jātivadvyakti)(e.g. ghaṭa)
Figure 3: Jayanta’s use of artha
The arrows represent necessary links. They are either rooted in the nature of
things (such as the one between individual and natural kind) or in a convention
which cannot be altered by human beings (saṅketa ‘stipulation’, the conventional
relation holding between the word ghaṭa ‘pot’ and its meaning).⁵¹
⁵¹On saṅketa and competing Indian theories, see Arnold (2006).
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The artha does not exist as a concrete entity, but neither is it a psychological
abstraction, since it depends on the reality of things and is therefore the same for
all human beings. The possibility of using language to communicate knowledge is
based on these necessary links. Note also that such a scheme vaguely recalls Ogden
and Richards’ semiotic triangle (Ogden and Richards 1923: 11).
ęčĔĚČčę
ĘĞĒćĔđ ėĊċĊėĊēę
Figure 4: Semiotic triangle
Jayanta deϐined the artha as tadvān, i.e., “the [vyakti] endowed with that (its
jāti)”.⁵² Note, Jayanta did not say that the artha is a piṇḍa tadvān, which would
be theoretically legitimate, since the jāti is said to exist within the piṇḍa. In fact,
the meaning does not refer to the ultimate concrete particular, the piṇḍa, which
lies beyond the grasp of language. It is only as vyakti that a piṇḍa can be accessed.
Consequently, the external object might be referred to as piṇḍa, if one has in view
a single concrete entity, whereas vyakti refers to its logical role as distinguished
from the jāti and provides the reference of linguistic acts.
Hence, something can be an artha without being a vastu (such is the case of
the meaning of false sentences or of ϐictional ones), and it can be a vastu although
it is not a piṇḍa. On the other hand, a piṇḍa is necessarily bāhya, but it can be de-
noted only via the fact that it is a vyakti. See the Table 1 for a survey of Jayanta’s
terminology.
Approach Terminology
linguistic artha
epistemological (jñeya) viṣaya
(prameya) vastu
ontological (knowable) jāti/vyakti
(noumenal) piṇḍa
Table 1: Jayanta’s terminology (Please note that jñā- refers to
all sorts of cognitions, whereas pramā- only to valid ones.)
See the Table 2 for a comparison of Jayanta’s terms with their suggested Euro-
pean parallels. The insertion of vyakti in two different rows of the Table 2 is meant
to accommodate the identiϐication—supported byAnalytic philosophers—of the
linguistic referent with the presumably real object.
Due to its generic usage, artha can also be used as a synonym of viṣaya (e.g.,
virodhārtha ‘point of disagreement’, in NM 5, Kataoka 2010: 194, §3.1) or vastu
⁵² gotvādijātyāvacchinnaṃ vyaktimātram artho yas tadvān ‘That meaning (artha) is the sheer indi-
vidual determined by the natural kind, such as cowness, the one (individual) endowed with that (a
natural kind)’ (NM 5, NM: 5).
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Approach Terminology European parallels
linguistic artha meaning
vyakti referent
epistemological (jñeya) viṣaya mental representation
(prameya) vastu propositional content
ontological (knowable) jāti natural kind
vyakti individual
(noumenal) piṇḍa concrete particular
Table 2: Scheme of European Terms
śabda artha
vyakti
(e.g. an individual pot)
piṇḍa
(extralinguistic entity)
(e.g. ghaṭa ‘pot’) (deϐined as jātivadvyakti)
Figure 5: Semantic connections according to Jayanta
(cf. the common usage of yathārtha-jñāna ‘cognition which conforms to its ob-
ject’, i.e. ‘valid cognition’, in NM 1). It can also be used to denote ‘external object’
when one does not want to take into account its concreteteness or its individual-
ity, or even its epistemological soundness (e.g., apohaḥ […] jñānārthābhyām anyaḥ
‘the apoha is different from both cognition and [external] objects’, NM 5, Kataoka
2010: 473–472, §2). If this is the case, one will need to interpret artha accordingly.
A piṇḍa ‘concrete particular’ becomes a vyakti insofar as it participates of a nat-
ural kind. Only once it is conceptualised as a vyakti it enters, indirectly, the domain
of language, see Figure 5.
Thedottedarrow stands for the link interveningbetweenapiṇḍa, understood
as an extralinguistic entity, and its rationalisation as a vyakti, an individual or token
of a given natural kind.
As for vastu, by this term Jayanta designated the propositional content that has
been cognised through one of the instruments of knowledge. Therefore, vastu, al-
thoughnot directly belonging to the linguistic circuit, plays an important rolewhen
one has in view— like Jayanta had— language as an instrument of knowledge. In
otherwords, neither piṇḍa nor vastu belong to language stricto sensu, but they pro-
vide language with — respectively — an ontological and epistemological anchor-
age (see Figure 6).
The double-lined arrow represents the fact that vyakti and vastu are onto-
logically one and the same thing, although considered from two different points
of view. A vyakti becomes a vastu only insofar as it has been known through an
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instrument of knowledge.
An increased awareness of the theoretical issues involved in the debate on lan-
guagemay alsomake us aware of themental aspect of linguistic referring, and thus
better understand the opposition between pratītyā ‘cognitively’ and sattayā ‘onto-
logically’ (see above, section 2.4). Jayanta was very cautious about the existence of
arthas only pratītyā, probably in order to distantiate the Nyāya position from the
Buddhist one. His solution, therefore, will be that the ontological status of arthas is
not discussed, but the epistemological value of linguistic communication is guaran-
teedby the fact that the artha is connectedwith the vastu, as can beproven through
the fact that the same object of linguistic expressions, the vyakti tadvān, can also
be known through perception and the other means of knowledge.⁵³
3 Conclusions
Wecan conclude, therefore, that Jayantawas not just using different terms tomean
oneand the same thing. By contrast, grasping the theoretic depthof Jayanta’s thought
on languagemay signiϐicantly improve our ability to understand, translate and crit-
ically edit his texts.
As for the issue at stake, śabdas ‘linguistic expressions’ are bound to arthas
‘meanings’, and thus refer deterministically to vastu ‘objective propositional con-
tent’ as vyaktis ‘individuals’ of some jāti ‘natural kind’, leaving behind the piṇḍas
‘concrete particulars’. In this way, language can be a means of knowledge.
In view of the goal we stated at the beginning, namely, enhancing our under-
standing of Jayanta by looking at his work also through the lens of philosophy of
language, let us also use a contemporary linguistic approach to point out some
ϐineties which may have been overlooked by sheer philologists:
• Abstract vs. concretedichotomy:The concreteparticular,piṇḍa, is beyond the
grasp of language, thus language deals only with the abstract level. However,
piṇḍa provides the anchorage of language to reality.
⁵³On pramāṇasamplava ‘concurrence of various instruments of knowledge [to the cognition of a sin-
gle object]’ as a legitimate way to guarantee the cognition’s validity, see Freschi and Graheli 2005: 312.
śabda artha
vyakti
(e.g. an individual pot)
piṇḍa
(extralinguistic entity)
(e.g. ghaṭa ‘pot’) (deϐined as jātivadvyakti)
vastu
(acquired object of knowledge)
Figure 6: Semantic and ontological connections according to Jayanta
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• Class vs. individual dichotomy: For Jayanta, the individual can be spoken of
only insofar as it is a token of a class. From the epistemological viewpoint,
however, the class is grasped only insofar as it inheres in an individual.
• Mental vs. realdichotomy: Jayantawanted to reject thenominalistic approach
of the Buddhists. Thus, although the artha is deϐined by him as a concept,
Jayanta was very keen to stress its deterministic connection with reality as
it can be grasped through the other means of knowledge (i.e., its vastutva).
• Ideal language vs. everyday’s language dichotomy: Due to the inϐluence of
Vedic exegesis, Jayanta— likemost other Indian authors—was quite aware
of the distinction between ordinary and technical language. Nonetheless, he
seems to have maintained that the rules of the one remain valid also for the
other (as explicitly claimed by Mı̄māṃsā authors, see SƵBh ad MS 1.1.1). An
artiϐicial language, that of NavyaNyāya, would be elaborated only later in the
history of Nyāya with the purpose of exactly representing its object.
• Vague vs. determinate dichotomy: Due to his concern for the epistemic func-
tion of language, Jayanta needed to deterministically link language and real-
ity. However, the level of reality that the language refers to is that of the indi-
vidual members of certain natural kinds. Language cannot be deterministic
all the way down to the concrete particulars (e.g. each concrete cow). Indi-
viduals are spoken about insofar as they share common characters but not
insofar as their concrete particular characteristics are concerned. To sum-
marize: the vagueness of language is not explicitly taken into account (sim-
ilarly to what happens in Russell’s referentialism), although Jayanta knew
that words cannot refer to ultimate particulars (see above, fn. 48). Conse-
quently, within the “śabda-artha-extralinguistic entity” scheme (see Figure
3), something (the piṇḍa) remains beyond the grasp of language.
• Cognitive vs. linguistic dichotomy: Jayanta dealt with language as an instru-
ment of knowledge. The possible gap between concepts and linguistic ex-
pressions apt to express them is not taken into account. It seems that for
Jayanta there is no chance for a concept not to be expressible by language.
However, he uses a special term (vastu) for the rightly acquired object of
knowledge independently of its being spoken of by language, thus seemingly
admitting the possibility of knowledge independent of language. This per-
spective is also linked with the more inclusive nature of epistemology in In-
dia, which deals also with cases of false cognition (such as mirages, dreams,
hallucinations, etc.) and can therefore accommodate within itself also the
meaning of ϐictional linguistic expressions, etc.
• Content vs. expression dichotomy: Jayanta probably had a clear idea of the
distinction between form (signiϐier) and meaning (signiϐied), unseparably
linked. Being a Naiyāyika, he maintained that this link is due to a conven-
tion, but that this convention is unavailable to human beings, who cannot
change it (both points are as with Saussure). Jayanta was even aware of the
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arbitrariness of the signiϐier, since he recognized the phonological difference
between languages.⁵⁴
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andTradition”. In:Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction of Traditions in South
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and J.L. Shaw. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 253–297.
— (1986). “The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language”.
In: Synthese 69, pp. 81–106.
Siderits, Mark, Tom J. F. Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds. (2011). Apoha:
Buddhist nominalismandhumancognition. NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress.
Stein,M.Aurel, ed. (1961).Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅginı.̄ A Chronicle of theKings ofKaśmır̄.
Translatedwith an Introduction, Commentary&Appendices. 2 (reprint of the 1st
edition, London 1900). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
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Varadācārya, K.S., ed. (1969, 1983).Nyāyamañjarı̄ of Jayanta Bhaṭṭawith Ṭippani—
Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor. Vol. 2. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute.
Varzi, Achille C. (2001). “The Best Question”. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic 30.3,
pp. 251–258.
Watson, Alex and Kei Kataoka (2013). “Translation of the Section on Kumārila’s
Refutation of the Apoha Theory and of the Buddhist Refutation of Kumārila’s
Criticism of Apoha and of”. In: Proceedings of the Apoha Workshop, Wien 16–
20 April 2012. Ed. by Helmut Krasser and Patrick McAllister. Wien: Verlag der
Oǆ sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Wezler, Albrecht (1994). “Credo quia Occidentale”. In: Studies inMım̄āṃsā. Dr. Man-
dan Mishra Felicitation Volume. Ed. by R.C. Dwivedi. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Whitney, W. D. (1893). “On Recent Studies in Hindu Grammar”. In: The American
Journal of Philology 14.2, pp. 171–197.
36
